A new route is one of the most sophisticated decisions in contemporary tourism.

It does not merely sell seats. It reshapes accessibility, international perception, economic relations, tourist flows and even the geopolitical centrality of a destination. Behind the announcement of a new air connection, in fact, lies a system far more complex than the public might imagine: months of analysis, financial simulations, demand studies, diplomatic negotiations, risk assessments and negotiations between public and private stakeholders who share a common objective.

When an airline decides to launch an intercontinental route, it is not simply choosing a departure airport and an arrival airport. It is betting on the future of a market.

It is imagining how people, capital, businesses, tourism and economic relations will move in the coming years. A direct route, in fact, changes the very perception of a destination. It reduces psychological distances even before physical ones. It makes it easier to invest, organise events, develop congresses, attract premium tourism and build new commercial relationships.

This is precisely where network planning comes into play, the true invisible brain of airlines. A strategic function that simultaneously observes hundreds of variables and that often determines the success or failure of an investment worth hundreds of millions of euros.

Airline network planning is the invisible strategy behind every new air route, shaping tourism, connectivity, destination accessibility and global economic relationships.

In aviation language, network planning is the structure that decides where to fly, at what frequency, with which aircraft and, above all, why. Tourist demand is only one part of the reasoning. A route may appear extremely attractive from a media or tourism perspective yet be economically fragile. Conversely, a less conspicuous route may become highly profitable thanks to the presence of business traffic, cargo, an international diaspora or strategic connections to other markets.

This is why a network director simultaneously considers different elements: potential passenger volume, spending capacity, seasonal distribution, premium traffic, inbound and outbound connections, fare competitiveness, fuel costs, airport slot availability, aircraft turnaround times, the reliability of the technical supply chain, cargo performance and the possibility of feeding the airline’s main hub.

In long-haul operations, the real issue is not simply filling the aircraft.

The real objective is to fill it well.

A flight with a very high load factor may lose money if average fares are low. Another, less full route may instead generate higher margins through the sale of business class, premium economy, corporate traffic or freight transport.

For this reason, many decisions do not depend exclusively on the number of tourists interested in visiting a destination. In some cases, tourism is actually only a secondary component compared with the route’s overall economic balance.

In recent years, technology has profoundly changed the logic behind the launch of new routes. Aircraft such as the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, the Airbus A350 or the new Airbus A321XLR have reduced consumption, operating costs and financial risk. This means that today an airline can launch intercontinental connections even to smaller or less established markets than in the past.

The aircraft itself has become a strategic tool for destination marketing. An Airbus A321XLR, for example, makes it possible to connect cities that previously could never have economically supported a traditional widebody.

This marks the emergence of the so-called “long thin routes”: long routes with moderate demand that become sustainable thanks to the new generation of aircraft.

Behind this choice, however, lies an enormous investment. A single widebody can cost hundreds of millions of dollars when purchase, leasing, maintenance, crew training, insurance and operational management are taken into account.

For this reason, an airline assesses with extreme care how much a new route can contribute not only to direct profit, but to the entire network ecosystem.

Long-haul operations also expose the airline more heavily to external factors: fuel price fluctuations, geopolitical tensions, economic crises, currency variations, supply chain problems and changes in international business demand.

Every new intercontinental route is a highly complex industrial gamble.

The most interesting part of launching a route is often the invisible one. Imagine a tourism board seeking to increase the international accessibility of an emerging destination. The airline would not be the only party seated around the table.

There would be airports, tourism ministries, chambers of commerce, government representatives, DMCs, tour operators, local investors, hotel chains, convention bureaux and sometimes even major local companies interested in facilitating direct international connections.

The launch of an important route is almost always the result of an economic and diplomatic coalition.

The airport might guarantee reductions in airport fees during the first years of operation. The tourism board might finance joint marketing campaigns in the origin markets. Tour operators might commit through allotments, charter commitments or minimum sales volumes. Hotels might participate in coordinated promotional initiatives. Certain institutions, meanwhile, might intervene by facilitating bilateral agreements, traffic rights, slots or operational procedures.

The airline, for its part, must guarantee operational capacity, continuity of service, commercial investment, international distribution and the economic sustainability of the route. And it is precisely here that the most delicate part of every negotiation arises: the distribution of risk.

In long-haul operations, no airline wants to bear entirely on its own the cost of developing a new market. This is why many routes are initially launched with reduced frequencies, often seasonally, entering a lengthy testing phase that may last from 18 to 36 months. During this period, load factor, yield, advance bookings, corporate demand, the ability to reduce seasonality and connection performance are monitored.

There are recent cases that clearly demonstrate this dynamic. Qantas’s Perth–Rome route represented far more than a simple connection between Australia and Italy. It strengthened Perth’s strategic role as Western Australia’s gateway to Europe, capturing a strong high-value leisure component and reducing dependence on major intermediate hubs. The capacity increase planned for 2026 shows that the route has successfully passed the consolidation phase.

United Airlines, meanwhile, consolidated Newark–Cape Town, transforming a route initially perceived as experimental into a stable axis between the United States and South Africa thanks to the combination of premium tourism, business traffic, diaspora and connections from the American hub.

British Airways also achieved positive results on London–Cincinnati, demonstrating that success does not necessarily depend on the destination’s tourism profile. In this case, the main factors were economic density, corporate demand, the absence of direct competition and the ability to feed Heathrow as a global hub.

Not every gamble works, however. Virgin Atlantic suspended the London–Austin connection after just two years, demonstrating how fragile a route built around a very specific economic ecosystem can be—in that case, the American technology sector. When business demand behaviour changes, even a dynamic destination can rapidly lose appeal.

A route does not necessarily fail because passengers are lacking. Sometimes it fails because the economic model that was supposed to support it changes.

In low-cost short-haul operations, the picture changes radically. Here the model is built above all on extreme efficiency. Airlines seek lower-cost airports, very rapid turnarounds, high fleet utilisation, price-sensitive demand and strong traffic volumes.

The average ticket value is lower, but ancillary revenues, direct sales and operational simplicity become fundamental. A low-cost route can be opened and closed much more quickly than an intercontinental route. Sometimes just a few months are enough to assess its economic sustainability.

The relationship with local territories also changes profoundly. In the low-cost model, regional airports often become genuine commercial partners of the airlines, offering economic incentives, marketing support, promotional contributions and advantageous operating conditions in order to attract traffic and international visibility.

In long-haul operations, a route represents an industrial, strategic and geopolitical statement. In low-cost short-haul operations, it represents above all a sophisticated machine of commercial efficiency.

And this is probably the most interesting point to understand: when an airline opens a new route, it is not simply transporting passengers. It is deciding which cities will be closer to the world and which, instead, risk remaining on the margins of the major trajectories of international tourism.

Want to explore the topic in greater depth? Download the white paper below to discover how airlines, airports, and destinations decide where the world will fly next.

IATA – Network Planning and Aviation Strategy

Airbus Global Market Forecast 2025–2044

Boeing Commercial Market Outlook

Qantas – Perth–Rome Route Expansion

United Airlines – Newark to Cape Town Service

British Airways – Cincinnati Route Information

Virgin Atlantic suspends Austin route – Aviation Week analysis CAPA Centre for Aviation – Route Development Analysis

ACI Europe – Airport Incentives and Route Development

OAG Aviation – Airline Network and Capacity Intelligence

Cirium – Aviation Analytics and Route Performance

ICAO – Air Transport Development and Bilateral Agreements

By Daniele Di Stefano